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Protecting intellectual property is the government’s most 
important tool to encourage innovation, as our country has 
understood since its founding.1 The Constitution provides for 
the grant of exclusive patent rights to “promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts.”2 Thomas Jefferson, who was initially 
skeptical of the value of patents, later remarked, “An Act of 
Congress authorising [sic] the issuing patents for new discoveries 
has given a spring to invention beyond my conception.”3 From the 
very first patent, issued in 1790, to the 10 millionth patent, issued 
in June 2018,4 the United States has seen remarkable amounts of 
invention and innovation largely due to its strong patent system. 
A strong patent system is one that effectively provides exclusive 
rights for invention and innovation.
The American public benefits from innovations incentivized 
by this patent system and relies ever more on new technologies 
to make life more productive, enjoyable, and comfortable. 
Given these benefits, one might think that the public interest in 
maintaining a patent system with strong incentives for inventors 
would be unquestioned; for a long time, it was. Recently, though, 
judges in patent cases have begun to erode the rights of patentees 
for the purported purpose of protecting the public’s interest.5 Has 
the public’s interest really changed? This article examines shifting 
interpretations of the public’s interest in patent law and explains 
why an accurate understanding of the public interest actually 
requires us to restore our strong patent system to encourage 
innovation.
I. The Public’s Interest in Patent Law
Patent law performs a balancing act between promoting 
innovation and protecting competition.6 On one hand, patents 
are property rights given to encourage inventors to create, 
1  See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and the 
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause 
of the United States Constitution, 2 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1 (1994).
2  U.S. Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 8.
3  Letter from Jefferson to Benjamin Vaughan (June 27, 1790) in 16 
Papers of Jefferson (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1956-92) 579, cited 
in Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, 
Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 993, 1030-32 
(2006). For additional historical context, see also Sean M. O’Connor, 
The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property Clause, U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 733 (2015); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas 
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in 
Historical Context, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 953 (2007).
4  See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Press Release 18-12, United States 
Issues Patent Number 10,000,000, June 19, 2018, available at https://
www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/united-states-issues-patent-
number-10000000.
5  To be fair, there are other issues that also threaten to erode a strong U.S. 
patent system, such as the uncertainty surrounding patent eligible subject 
matter. However, this article is focused only on the use of the “public 
interest” to weaken patent protection.
6  See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 146 
(1989); Roger Allan Ford, The Uneasy Case for Patent Federalism, 2017 
Wisc. L. Rev. 551, 568 (further describing this balance as “careful” and 
“delicate”).
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commercialize, and disclose their new technologies.7 The public 
has an interest in innovation—that is how it accesses new and 
improved technology and products. To incentivize innovation, 
the U.S. government grants patents that give their holders the 
right to exclude others for a limited time from making, using, 
selling, offering for sale, or importing the technology covered by 
those patents.8 On the other hand, this right to exclude creates a 
limited monopoly, which is the antithesis of principles underlying 
competition law.9 The public also has an interest in a competitive 
market that produces better products at lower prices.10 Patent 
law creates “an exception to the general rule against monopolies” 
and balances the public’s conflicting interests in innovation and 
competition by granting patents only for inventions that warrant 
such a reward.11 Because of the careful balance struck by the patent 
system—with a high bar for patentability and a time limit on the 
monopoly given—as well as the importance of patents as part of 
a larger economic scheme, it is generally accepted that respecting 
patent rights is in the public interest.12
Outside of the general notion of the public’s interest in an 
effective and reliable patent system, the topic of “public interest” 
is rarely discussed in patent law. The primary exception is in the 
imposition of remedies for patent infringement. District court 
judges are required to consider the public interest as a factor when 
deciding whether to grant an injunction against a party found to 
7  See, e.g., Richard B. Klar, Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC: The Right 
to Exclude Under U.S. Patent Law and the Public Interest, 88 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc’y 852, 858 (2006).
8  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
9  See, e.g., Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law & the Economics of 
Preemption, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 959, 973 (1991) (“The law has presumed 
since at least the Statute of Monopolies that only the antithesis of free 
competition, the grant of exclusive rights, will suffice to stimulate the 
optimal level of new creation.”).
10  See, e.g., Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 
83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1943, 1952 (2016) (“Increased competition is a clear 
public benefit. . . .”).
11  Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery, 
324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (“A patent by its very nature is affected 
with a public interest. . . . It is an exception to the general rule against 
monopolies and to the right to access a free and open market. The far-
reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give 
the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring 
from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and 
that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.”). See also 
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“The balance between 
the interest in motivating innovation and enlightenment by rewarding 
invention with patent protection on one hand, and the interest in 
avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, 
has been a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception.”).
12  See, e.g., Amazon.com Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com Inc., 73 F.Supp.2d 
1228, 1248-49 (W.D. Wash. 1999), vacated and remanded, 239 
F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The public has a strong interest in the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. The purpose of the patent 
system is to reward inventors and provide incentives for further 
innovation by preventing others from exploiting their work. . . . 
Encouraging [the patent owner] to continue to innovate—and forcing 
competitors to come up with their own new ideas—unquestionably best 
serves the public interest.”).
be infringing a patent.13 At the International Trade Commission 
(ITC), administrative law judges (ALJs) are statutorily required 
to consider the public interest before issuing an exclusion order to 
prevent importation of infringing goods into the United States.14 
Although both doctrines involve the public’s interest, courts have 
noted that they differ due to the “long standing principle that 
importation is treated differently than domestic activity.”15
At the stage when judges consider the public interest, the 
party who is facing an injunction (at the district court) or an 
exclusion order (at the ITC) has already been found liable for 
infringing a valid patent. One might assume a judge would 
determine that the public interest supports allowing infringement 
to occur rather than maintaining strong patent rights only in 
extraordinary cases. In the past, this has been true, but judges 
are increasingly invoking the public interest to deny injunctive 
relief. Before arguing that this shift in how judges think about 
the public interest is a problem that must be fixed, this article will 
describe the role the public interest is supposed to play at both 
the district courts and the ITC.
II. Public Interest at the District Courts
In patent infringement cases decided by district courts, the 
question of the public’s interest arises when a judge determines 
whether to grant an injunction that would prohibit the infringer 
from continuing to infringe. Historically, permanent injunctions 
were issued against parties found to be infringing nearly as a matter 
of course.16 The courts based this rule on the “belief that once 
infringement has been established denying a patentee the right 
to exclude is contrary to the laws of property.”17 
Despite this general rule in favor of injunctions, courts 
would very occasionally deny injunctive relief to protect the public 
interest.18 For example, in the 1930s, the Seventh Circuit denied 
an injunction in a case where enjoining the infringer’s use of the 
patented technology would leave an “entire community without 
any means for disposal of raw sewage.”19 In the 1980s, the Federal 
Circuit declined to issue an injunction where to do so would “cut 
off the supply of . . . test kits for cancer patients.”20 These are fairly 
13  See Section II., infra.
14  See Section III., infra.
15  See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2010).
16  See, e.g., MercExchange, LLC, v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005).
17  See Klar, supra note 7, at 855 (citing 35 U.S.C. §154; Honeywell Int’l Inc. 
v. Universal Sys. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D. Del. 2004).
18  See, e.g., Rite-Hite v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547-48 (en banc) (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 
(C.D. Cal. 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (injunction 
denied in case involving medical test kits), Vitamin Technologists, 
Inc. v. Wisc. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945) 
(injunction denied in case involving irradiation of margarine), and City 
of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) 
(injunction denied in a case involving sewage disposal)).
19  See City of Milwaukee, 69 F.2d at 593.
20  See Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1458.
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uncontroversial examples of how the public’s interest in health and 
safety may outweigh the public’s interest in effective and reliable 
patent rights. With few exceptions, until 2006, injunctions were 
routinely granted unless there was a showing of strong public 
interest involving health and safety.21
The situation changed in 2006 when the Supreme Court, in 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, determined the Federal Circuit’s 
presumption in favor of issuing a permanent injunction in cases of 
patent infringement was in error.22 The Supreme Court instructed 
lower courts to instead consider a four-factor test “according to 
well-established principles of equity” when deciding whether 
to issue permanent injunctions.23 A post-eBay plaintiff seeking 
injunctive relief is required to show:
1. that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
2. that monetary damages are inadequate to compensate 
for that injury;
3. that the balance of the hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant weighs in favor of the plaintiff; and
4. that the public interest would not be disserved by the 
injunction.24
After eBay, courts often paid lip service to the four-factor test, 
but continued to issue injunctions in the vast majority of cases.25
More recently, however, courts have used the discretion 
afforded by the eBay four-factor test to effect policy through denial 
of injunctive relief. For example, courts have focused on the first 
two factors—irreparable harm and adequate remedy—to deny 
injunctions to patent assertion entities.26 Patent assertion entities 
have been defined in various ways, but most commonly they are 
firms that generate income by purchasing patents and litigating 
against, or licensing to, other companies that are using the 
technology covered by the patent.27 Courts have also often found 
the public interest to be disserved by grant of injunctions when 
21  For one of the more amusing exceptions, see CF Inflight, Ltd. v. Cablecam 
Sys., Ltd., No. CI.A 03-CV-5374, 2004 WL 234372, at 9 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 30, 2004) (in a case involving aerial photography of the Super 
Bowl, a judge denied a preliminary injunction in view of the public 
interest, stating, “While there may not exist a compelling concern for 
public health, there is most certainly a public demand and interest in 
experiencing this visual perspective.”).
22  547 U.S. 388, 393-394 (2006).
23  See id.
24  Id. at 391.
25  See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation 
After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1949, 1982-1983 
(2016) (finding an injunction issued in approximately three-quarters of 
cases post-eBay).
26  See id. at 1988-89 (finding injunctions were granted in only 16% of cases 
involving patent assertion entities); Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent 
Remedies, 67 U. Miami L. Rev. 95, 111 (2012) (noting that patent 
assertion entities “are hard pressed to get an injunction” post-eBay). 
27  See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Sticks and Stones: How the FTC’s Name-Calling 
Misses the Complexity of Licensing-Based Business Models, 22 Geo. Mason 
L. Rev. 1001, 1014-1016 (2015) (discussing the varying definitions 
given to patent assertion entities, also known as non-practicing entities or 
patent trolls).
the plaintiff is a patent assertion entity, although they typically 
rely more on the other factors.28 In other cases, courts have used 
the public’s interest to delay, rather than deny, injunctive relief, 
giving an infringer time to design around the infringed patent 
before being enjoined from infringing.29
Additionally, courts have begun using the four-factor test, 
including the public interest factor, to deny injunctive relief to 
companies that participate in standard setting organizations 
and have asserted standard essential patents (SEPs). The Federal 
Circuit has unequivocally stated that injunctive relief is available 
for infringement of SEPs, subject to the eBay four-factor test.30 
In fact, the Federal Circuit notes, “the public has an interest in 
encouraging participation in standard-setting organizations.”31 
However, courts have still sometimes held that the public interest 
in accessing infringing products incorporating SEP technology 
outweighs its interest in respecting the patentee’s property rights.32
III. Public Interest at the ITC
In the district courts, the public’s interest has been interjected 
via common law and the Supreme Court’s eBay decision. But the 
public interest is part of the ITC’s statutory scheme. As in district 
court, the public interest becomes important at the remedy stage, 
after patent infringement has been found. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)
(1) states that: 
If the Commission determines . . . that there is a violation  
. . ., it shall direct that the articles concerned . . . be excluded 
from entry into the United States, unless, after considering 
the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and 
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States 
economy, the production of like or directly competitive 
articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it 
finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry.33 
When the statute was enacted, a Senate Committee explicitly 
noted that the enumerated concerns could override the 
exclusionary rights of the patentee.34 
28  See Seaman, supra note 25, at 1995 (finding that in 52% of the cases 
where an injunction was denied the court also found an injunction 
would disserve the public interest). 
29  See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 704 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (allowing a 20-month delay before providing an injunctive remedy 
because “an immediate permanent injunction would adversely affect the 
public”).
30  See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). A standard essential patent (SEP) is one that covers an aspect or 
component of a technology standard and is necessarily infringed when a 
standard-compliant device is made or used or when a standard-compliant 
service is performed. 
31  See id. at 1332.
32  For example, in a case involving a number of SEPs owned by Motorola, a 
judge determined that the public interest required Microsoft to be able 
to continue its business operations because of the presence of SEPs and 
because Microsoft’s consumers rely on being able to use the infringing 
products. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1103 
(W.D. Wash. 2012). 
33  19 U.S.C. §1337(d)(1).
34  See S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at 35 (1974).
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In recent years, the ITC approved new regulations which, 
among other things, moved the public interest to the forefront 
of the ITC’s analysis. A complainant must file, “concurrently 
with the complaint, a separate statement of public interest” 
explaining how the requested relief would affect public health 
and welfare, competitive conditions, competitive articles, and 
U.S. consumers.35 Respondents and others may file responses 
to the patentee’s public interest statement. This shift permitted 
additional fact-finding on matters of public interest,36 but the 
crux of the public interest analysis occurs when the judge decides 
whether to issue an exclusion order.
Although it is specifically provided for in the statute, ITC 
judges have rarely invoked the public interest to deny an exclusion 
order; injunctive relief is issued in nearly all cases in which the 
ITC finds patent infringement.37 In fact, in the forty years prior 
to 2018, the ITC determined that the public interest trumped 
issuance of an exclusion order in only four cases.38 Two cases from 
the 1980s involved fairly clear-cut issues of public health and 
safety. In one case, the ITC declined to issue an exclusion order 
barring import of specialized hospital beds for burn victims where 
the domestic producer of the beds could not meet demand and 
there were no therapeutically comparable beds available in the 
U.S.39 In another case, the ITC did not exclude acceleration tubes 
required for basic atomic research because the imported tubes were 
of a higher quality than those available from domestic suppliers 
and “basic scientific research . . . is precisely the kind of activity 
intended by Congress” when considering the public health and 
welfare.40 In 1997, the ITC stated expressly that, unless a case 
involved drugs or medical devices, it was unlikely that it would 
meet the public interest exception.41 Even then, the ITC has 
35  See 19 C.F.R. § 210.8(b).
36  See id.; P. Andrew Riley and Scott A. Allen, The Public Interest Inquiry for 
Permanent Injunctions or Exclusion Orders: Shedding the Myopic Lens, 17 
Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 751, 763-64 (2015).
37  See Colleen Chien, Patently Protectionist?: An Empirical Analysis of Patent 
Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
63, 70 (2008) (finding injunctive relief granted to prevailing patentees 
in 100% of cases from 1995-2007); Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, 
Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of International Trade 
Decisions, 21 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 457, 484 (2008) (finding injunctive 
relief granted in 96% of cases where infringement was found).
38  See, e.g., Riley & Allen, supra note 36, at 758-59 (2015) (“Only four ITC 
decisions have used the public interest exception as a means to deny an 
exclusion order where it was otherwise appropriate.”); Colleen V. Chien 
& Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, & the Public Interest, 98 
Cornell L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (2012).
39  See Certain Fluidizing Supporting Apparatus and Components Thereof, 
Inv. 337-TA-182/188, USITC Pub. 1667 (Oct. 5, 1984) (Final) 
(Commission Memorandum Opinion).
40  See Certain Inclined Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, 
Inv. No. 337-TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119 (Dec. 29, 1980) (Final) 
(Commission Action and Order).
41  See Certain Toothbrushes and the Packaging Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
391, USITC Pub. 3068, at 6 (Oct. 15, 1997) (Final) (Commission 
Opinion on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding) (“Toothbrushes 
are not the type of product that have in the past raised public interest 
concerns (such as, for example, drugs or medical devices).”); Certain 
Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 
typically required not just a clear issue of health and safety, but also 
an inability of domestic industry to satisfy consumer demand.42 
Despite its general focus on health and safety, the ITC has 
invoked the public interest in cases involving other concerns. For 
example, during an oil shortage in 1979, the ITC used the public 
interest to decline to exclude importation of crankpin grinders 
used to make components for internal combustion motors. The 
Commission found there was an overriding national interest in 
the supply of fuel-efficient automobiles in light of the oil crisis 
and that the domestic industry was unable to meet demand for 
these parts.43 Although this aspect of the public interest is broader 
than health and safety, it still is based in part on the inability of 
domestic industry to supply a product demanded by the public.
Given the decreased likelihood of obtaining injunctive relief 
in district court after eBay, some commentators have claimed that 
patentees are “flocking” to the ITC “in search of injunctions or 
the credible threat of injunctions.”44 Although this may have been 
a smart move in the past, the ITC also has started to move away 
from its longstanding policy of issuing injunctions except in very 
rare cases involving health and safety concerns where the domestic 
industry cannot supply enough to meet demand.
Instead, the ITC has been using the public interest to effect 
policy choices in the technology innovation space. Academic 
commentators have encouraged the ITC to do just this. For 
example, Colleen Chien and Mark Lemley suggested the ITC 
should use the discretion afforded by the required public interest 
inquiry to shape patent policy.45 They proposed that the ITC 
consider whether the value of a patentee’s technology is small 
compared to the value of the product of which it is a part and 
to allow continued infringement in cases where this is the case.46 
Practitioners too have advocated the tactic of invoking the public 
interest at the ITC, in part because the ITC’s inability to award 
money damages means a denial of an exclusion order is a “total 
and complete victory” for infringers.47
Despite these calls to deny injunctive relief, the ITC had 
previously shown that it understood the public interest in an 
effective and reliable patent system. In 2011, the ITC issued a 
partial exclusion order in a case involving mobile phones using 
337-TA-383, USITC Pub. 2991, at 9 (Oct. 15, 1996) (Commission 
Opinion on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding) (making the 
same statement with respect to hardware logic emulators).
42  See Certain Crystalline Cefadroxil Monohydrate, Inv. No. 337-TA-293, 
USITC Pub. 2391 (Mar. 21, 1990) (Final) (Commission Opinion on the 
Issue Under Review, and on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding) 
at 46-47 (issuing an exclusion in the case of a medical drug because a 
domestic manufacturer had “sufficient capacity and resources to satisfy all 
domestic demand”).
43  See Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC 
Pub. 1022 (Dec. 17, 1979) (Final) (Commission Determination and 
Order).
44  See Chien & Lemley, supra note 38, at 2.
45  See id. at 34-36.
46  See id.
47  See, e.g., Riley & Allen, supra note 36, at 754. Riley & Allen continue, 
“Litigants before the ITC may be especially well advised to critically 
evaluate and deploy the use of public interest positions.” See id.
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3G technology.48 The infringer had argued that the public 
interest would best be served by denying an exclusion order 
because first responders relied on GPS systems and the ED-VO 
interface provided by the patented technology.49 Nevertheless, 
the Commission recognized the tension between the public’s 
interest in health and safety and the public’s interest in a strong 
patent system: “We do not accept the general proposition that, if 
the infringing activity is great enough, the public interest forbids 
a remedy.”50 Rather than denying an exclusion order outright, 
the ITC’s decision crafted a more nuanced remedy with limited 
exceptions to the exclusion order.51
The public interest has been invoked to overrule an ITC 
exclusion order at higher levels within the executive branch. 
As part of the “smartphone patent wars” between Apple and 
Samsung, Samsung filed a complaint with the ITC, alleging 
that a number of Apple’s iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch devices 
infringed Samsung’s patents.52 The ITC found infringement and 
issued an exclusion order prohibiting importation, as well as a 
cease-and-desist order barring sale, of the infringing devices.53 
However, President Obama vetoed the order, claiming that the 
public interest counseled against this relief because Samsung’s 
patent was part of a technological standard and subject to fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing requirements.54 
Commentators have argued that the executive veto was “designed 
as a signal to the ITC to stop issuing injunctive relief without full 
consideration of the public interest at stake.”55
In October 2018, an ALJ at the ITC found that Apple 
had infringed a patent owned by Qualcomm.56 But the judge 
declined to issue an exclusion order, citing the public interest.57 
Although the full Commission has not yet weighed in on the 
48  See Certain Baseband Processor Chips & Chipsets, Transmitter and 
Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Prods. Containing 
Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, 337-TA-543, USITC 
Pub. 4258, at 3 (Oct. 2011).
49  See id. at 10-12, 140.
50  See id. at 153.
51  See id. 
52  See In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless 
Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, 
and Tablet Computer, Inv. No. 337-TA-794 (July 5, 2013) (Final).
53  See id.
54  See Veto of USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-794 (2013) (letter from Ambassador 
Michael B. G. Froman to the Honorable Irving A. Williamson, Aug. 
3, 2013), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20
Letter_1.PDF (citing the effects on “U.S. consumers” as a basis for the 
veto).
55  See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Is It Time to End the USITC’s Jurisdiction Over 
Patent Cases?, Patently-O (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2013/08/is-it-time-to-end-the-usitcs-jurisdiction-over-patent-
cases.html.
56  See In the Matter of Certain Mobile Electronic Devices and Radio 
Frequency and Processing Components Thereof, Inv. 337-TA-1065 
(Sept. 28, 2018) (Notice Regarding Initial Determination and 
Recommended Determination).
57  See id. 
matter, the judge’s findings regarding the public interest signal 
a bias against companies that participate in standard setting 
organizations similar to that found among district court judges. 
The judge noted that two suppliers are better than one when it 
comes to standardized technology and that, should the infringing 
product be excluded, the supplier would be less competitive as 
the technology standards progressed, which could in turn harm 
national security.58 
IV. Restoring the Concept of the Public’s Interest in A 
Strong Patent System
Despite years of acknowledging that the public has a strong 
interest in an effective and reliable patent system, and in the 
technological innovations such a patent system makes possible, 
judges and commentators have shifted in recent years away from 
that perspective. It was easier to understand the courts’ and 
ITC’s decisions to put public health and safety ahead of patent 
protection in the earlier cases. After all, treating sewage and caring 
for burn victims certainly fall within an ordinary view of the 
public’s interest. But the recent shift at both the district courts and 
the ITC is harder to understand. These institutions are subverting 
traditional patent rights in the name of the public’s interest, but 
without fully exploring whether there really is a public interest 
problem at all. 
The problem with the public interest analysis in these kinds 
of cases is two-fold. First, there is little evidence that granting 
injunctions would adversely affect the public’s interest. Second, 
the analysis neglects the interests of patent-holder plaintiffs who 
are actually parties to these cases. Either of these issues alone 
would be sufficient to require a more careful look at the public’s 
interest in whether injunctive relief is issued in these cases. Because 
both issues are generally present, it seems unlikely that the public 
interest would ever warrant trumping a patentee’s right to an 
injunction in these types of cases. 
The problems to which the courts and ITC point as 
supporting denial of injunctive relief are at best speculative 
and at worst nonexistent. Consider the ALJ’s rather tenuous 
argument in the Qualcomm case described above: if an infringer 
is not allowed to continue infringing, it will be less competitive 
in and likely exit from a new technology area, and that will 
lead to national security concerns. This chain of reasoning is 
incredibly speculative. The development of the technology area in 
question, 5G mobile connectivity, is being led by numerous global 
companies, including Qualcomm, Intel, Samsung, Ericsson, and 
others,59 and it will be implemented and rolled out by these and 
countless other manufacturers. There is little evidence that any 
of the important players would exit the 5G space if prohibited 
58  See In the Matter of Certain Mobile Electronic Devices and Radio 
Frequency and Processing Components Thereof, Inv. 337-TA-1065 
(Sept. 28, 2018), at 193-96 (Initial Determination and Recommended 
Determination – Public Version). In a surprising twist, a judge in China 
recently granted Qualcomm’s request for injunctive relief against Apple 
in a similar patent case in that country. See, e.g., David Goldman, China 
bans sale of most iPhone models after granting Qualcomm an injunction 
against Apple, CNN (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/10/
tech/china-iphone-ban/index.html.
59  See, e.g., 5G, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5G.
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from importing infringing products, nor is there any evidence 
that national security concerns would result even if one of these 
companies did stop working in the 5G space. Decisions to override 
the public’s interest in a strong patent system cannot be grounded 
in conjecture alone.
Some judges have also based denials of injunctive relief on a 
doctrine called patent holdup, which has been proven to be false. 
Whether the plaintiff is a patent assertion entity or a participant 
in a standard setting organization, the concern underlying this 
doctrine is that the patent holder will be able to seek unfairly 
high licensing rates for use of their patents because of the threat 
of injunctive relief.60 Although the doctrine of patent holdup 
has been the subject of much theoretical discussion,61 empirical 
research does not support it.62 Despite the fact that the existence 
and impact of patent holdup has been questioned, most judges 
routinely accept the theoretical concern when denying injunctive 
relief in these cases.63 The public’s interest in an effective and 
reliable patent system should not be ignored in favor of a doctrine 
that has been shown to be false in the real world.
In addition to the public’s interest in an effective and 
reliable patent system, the public also has an interest in the 
very types of plaintiffs that have been denied injunctive relief. 
Patent assertion entities provide a valuable service, functioning 
as facilitators between inventors who cannot or do not want to 
manufacture their inventions and manufacturers who wish to 
use patented technologies.64 Companies that participate in and 
submit technology innovations to standard setting organizations 
also provide a valuable service, allowing these organizations to 
arrive at the optimal technology standard for any given problem.65 
60  See, e.g., Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone 
Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119 Penn St. L. Rev. 1, 4-7 (2014).
61  See id.; Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 Mich. 
Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2017); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Patent Holdup & Royalty Stacking, 85 Texas L. Rev. 1991, 2010-17 
(2007).
62  See, e.g., Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent 
Holdup Theory, 13 J. Competition L. & Econ. 1 (2017); Jonathan M. 
Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 Berkeley Tech. 
L.J. 1316, 1344 (2017) (finding that available empirical evidence does 
not support the theory of patent holdup); Damien Geradin, The Meaning 
of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of Third Party Determinations of 
FRAND Terms, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 919, 940 (2014) (“[A]lthough 
holdup and royalty stacking could occur in theory, there is little evidence 
that they regularly occur in the real world.”); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, 
Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent 
Infringement: A Reply to Lemley & Shapiro, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 714, 718-
19 (2008) (discussing studies that question the prevalence of hold-up and 
royalty stacking).
63  There is one case where a judge rejected the infringer’s argument that 
patent holdup should curtail the patentee’s requested remedy, noting that 
the defendants “failed to present any evidence of actual hold-up.” See 
Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 110585 (August 6, 
2013), at *63-66.
64  See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the 
‘Patent Troll’ Rhetoric, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 435, 450-52 (2014).
65  See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Ignorance Over Innovation: Why Misunderstanding 
Standard Setting Organizations Will Hinder Technological Progress, 56 U. 
Louisville L. Rev. 159, 166-169 (2018).
The public has an interest in the viability of both patent assertion 
entities and companies that participate in standard setting 
organizations, because both types of plaintiffs allow for more 
and better products to be made available on the market. In both 
cases, denying injunctive relief may discourage plaintiffs from 
continuing to participate in the field. Thus, the public has an 
interest not just in a strong and reliable patent system, but in a 
patent system that does not unduly discriminate against certain 
types of patent holders.
The recent shift in the patent system where district court 
judges and the ITC are more regularly denying injunctive relief 
in the name of the public interest needs to be corrected. Rather 
than basing the denial of injunctions and exclusion orders on 
speculative and tenuous reasoning or on the discredited doctrine 
of patent holdup, these institutions should take their mandates 
to consider the public interest more seriously. The public has an 
interest in an effective and reliable patent system. The public 
has an interest in more technology and innovation and a strong 
economy. Patent rights, including the very essence of patents—
the right to exclude—need to be respected. The public’s interest 
depends on it.
